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The Group for Debates in Anthropological Theory, University of Manchester, 12 November 2011 
Nondualism is Philosophy not Ethnography: For the Motion 
 
Steps to a Methodological Nondualism 
Michael W. Scott, London School of Economics & Political Science 
(m.w.scott@lse.ac.uk) 
 
By virtue of a kind of magical thinking that is both fruitful and perilous, some anthropologists 
are making powerful and efficacious connections between ethnography and various 
continental philosophies said to instantiate nondualism.  These intellectual connections, I 
affirm, both find and create real relations.  Surprisingly, however — and this is the key point 
I wish to highlight — there is now a need to remind ourselves that these are indeed relations, 
not equivalencies.  In ways that are arguably more monistic than nondual, we are at risk of 
mistaking the relations of similarity we see between certain philosophies and the orientations 
of the people we meet in the field (and in ethnography) for indices of identity.  Lost in 
wonder at the inventive discovery of these mystical correspondences — which we can 
manipulate to work amazing transformations on our own and other people’s ethnography — 
we have begun to liberate all kinds of actual cosmologies, epistemologies, and ontologies 
from their ephemeral historical bodies and are restoring their inner plenitudes to the 
shimmering flux of universal becoming. 
In my view, this engagement with metaphysics is among the most productive and 
challenging trajectories in anthropology today.  For purposes of this debate, I follow the lead 
of its founder, Tim Ingold (2011: 229-243), and define the anthropological craft of 
ethnography as philosophy, with people — including, even, with philosophers.  Accordingly, 
I am not advocating a utopian purification of speculation from field research, or of 
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philosophy per se from ethnography.  Rather, I simply raise a flag beside what I see as the 
opposite but currently more proximate utopian pitfall: the temptation to translate differences 
away, to misrecognize affinities between nondualist readings of philosophies and diverse 
indigenous ontologies as unities and — on the basis of that small misstep — fall into an 
ethnographic habit of making all lived ontologies collectively and inevitably point — like 
perspectival bodies — to an immanent-transcendent multiplicity posited as shifting-absolute 
truth.  (And I’m not saying that it isn’t, only that maybe not everyone univocally agrees.) 
My concern is that our magically induced nondualism is aesthetically persuasive but 
potentially eschatological.  When it exhibits its monistic side — which some philosophers 
might argue is intrinsic to it — it abolishes history, transposing every lived ontology into 
conformity with its own eternally returning terms (compare Eliade 1974 [1954]).  The 
ethnographic analyses it informs can tend towards self-iteration, calling into question the 
need for field-based engagement in the very relations of which nondualism is said to be an 
infinite inflation.  At the same time, a monologic of fractal relationship can come to function 
as a general interdiction on essentialisms at any scale — whether monistic or pluralistic — 
either among anthropologists or the people with whom we work.  But I think it would be 
regrettable — and unnecessary — if the innovative and insight-generating anthropology of 
ontology were to exhaust itself this way.  A solution, I will argue, is for anthropologists to be 
even more engaged with all sides of philosophical debate about ontology and even more 
thoroughly nondual in our comparative methods.  First, however, let me clarify what I mean 
by nondualism and elaborate my observation that some anthropologists may be quasi-
monistically equating philosophical nondualisms with the ontological assumptions of their 
fieldwork interlocutors. 
I use the term nondualism as shorthand for a mode of being — or ontology — that, in 
anthropology, is sometimes also referred to as relationalism or — with increasing genericism 
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— simply as animism.  As anthropological theory, this ontology is most closely associated 
with the paradigms of Melanesian sociality, actor network theory, material semiotics, and 
perspectival multinaturalism.  But it goes by other names as well, such as posthumanism and 
postpluralism.  Contributors to anthropological theorizations of nondualism are, of course, 
not all saying the same thing; their models reflect their dialogues with different people in 
different field contexts and with different philosophers.  Yet two points of broad consensus 
are legible across this steadily inter-conversant literature. 
First, the many labels for what I am calling nondualism may be said to describe an 
ontology that puts relations before entities.  Theories of nondualism assert that terms are 
nothing but relations.  It’s relations all the way down and all the way up, in and out and 
through and through.  Nothing but relations; relations cubed.  Hence, there are no core 
essences, no elementary categories antecedent to relations.  Things do not enter into relations; 
they are made up of and inhere in relations. 
A second point of consensus, therefore, is that nondualism is the inverse of a modern 
Euro-American ontology often labelled Cartesian or Kantian dualism.  Within this modern 
mode of being, people inhabit a world made up of two radically distinct categories: the 
immaterial and the material.  Hence, the familiar set of oppositions — subject/object; 
mind/body; idea/thing; culture/nature, etc.  One common way of formulating this contrast 
between nondualism and Cartesian-Kantian dualism has been to claim that nondualists do not 
distinguish between the abstract and the concrete — especially in the register of the culture 
versus nature dichotomy.  In ways that invite further scrutiny, such formulations can make 
nondualists sound more like either material or noumenal monists.  For this reason, it may be 
clearer to emphasize the primacy of always already ongoing relations — including relations 
between the terms of these and other classic oppositions — as both ingredient to and 
sustaining all things. 
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It is a striking feature of the anthropological literature on nondualism that it is rich in 
references to the ideas and vocabularies of, among other continental philosophers, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Deleuze and Guattari.  Thus, a Heideggerian ‘ontology of 
dwelling’ in which the world appears in its ‘availableness’ to an immersed ‘being-in-the-
world’ is imputed to hunter-gatherers (e.g. Ingold, 2000: 42).  The thoughts of Merleau-Ponty 
on vision, movement, and the body are quoted as convergent with the epistemology of 
Aboriginal Australians (e.g. Tamisari, 1998).  Amazonian cosmogonic myths are translated 
into the Deleuzian tropes of molar entities actualizing out of a molecular pre-cosmological 
condition of virtual multiplicity (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 2007). 
Now, I would not want to be mistaken as saying that comparisons between Euro-
American and other modes of written or practical metaphysics are somehow illegitimate or 
misleading.  On the contrary, I find such comparisons, not only valid and enormously 
instructive but exciting and virtually impossible not to make.  In preparing for this debate I 
happened across a wonderful passage from Totemism, quoted in an essay by Morten Pedersen 
(2007), in which Lévi-Strauss vividly describes the mystic moment of ‘rhizomatic’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004: 3-28) association.  Lévi-Strauss writes: 
 
For the anthropologist, Bergson’s philosophy recalls irresistibly that of the Sioux, and 
he himself could have remarked the similarity since he had read and pondered Les 
Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.  Durkheim reproduces in this book a 
reflection by a Dakota wise man which formulates, in a language close to that of 
L’Évolution créatrice, a metaphysical philosophy, common to all the Sioux … 
according to which things and beings are nothing but materialised forms of creative 
continuity … (1964: 97-98, quoted in Pedersen, 2007: 314) 
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We’ve all made these Frazerian leaps (compare Willerslev, 2011).  Such connections 
are precisely the free and vital growth of what we know, mapping all the pathways that link 
the places where our thoughts have wandered.  I’m enamoured of the Surrealists, myself, so I 
might call this ‘objective chance’ (Breton, 1987: 87).  But precisely because such 
comparisons can be so cognitively powerful, it seems especially important to keep it in plain 
view that they are only comparisons — not exact matches.  Euro-American philosophical 
traditions — no matter how counter to mainstream dualism — are not context-free universal 
decoders.  It is easy to forget, however, that by deploying the models and vocabularies of 
these and other alternative Western ontologies we do not avoid representing our ethnographic 
interlocutors.  In dialogue with continental philosophies — and also, I would especially note, 
forms of post-dualist science such as biosemiotics — many anthropologists are striving to 
reorient ourselves towards nondualist thinking.  But our nondualisms are not isomorphic with 
those of our informants — if, in fact, our informants are nondualists.  For most of us there is 
probably still a significant gap between, say — recognizing that eventually the elements that 
compose our bodies will flow into other forms — and fears or hopes of immediate 
metamorphosis into another species (see also Holbraad, 2010: 435-436). 
If, however, we inadvertently conflate rather than compare our magical synthetic 
nondualism with apparently indigenous nondualisms, we can begin — in rather neo-dualistic 
ways — to seem to purify the world into two ontological types: a mainstream Cartesian-
Kantian ‘West’ and its outposts versus an almost pre-lapsarian nondualist ‘Rest’, situated in 
the places where we have tended to do fieldwork.  As Terence Evens (2008: 13) puts it, for 
example, ‘[t]he peoples of classic ethnography … epitomize a nondualistic mode of human 
existence.’ 
But what if Cartesian-Kantian dualists are not the only essentialists in the world?  
What if there are non-Cartesian-Kantian dualists, or non-Cartesian-Kantian pluralists?  
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Despite Latour’s (1993) brilliant irreduction of modern dualism, anthropologists continue to 
take this particular dualism seriously as a description of how some people think, feel, and act.  
We would probably hesitate to describe such people as nondualists on the strength that Latour 
has identified contradictions in their dualism that point to a universal default nondualism.  
Regardless of how we may evaluate it, we tend to respect the actuality of modern dualism as 
an ontology that makes a difference in the world.  We aspire to be faithful auto-
ethnographers, in other words. 
Curiously, however, in my experience, ethnographic attempts to theorize other 
essentialist ontologies can meet with sceptical resistance.  As some of you may know, I have 
analyzed the cosmology of the Arosi of the island of Makira in Solomon Islands as what I 
term a poly-ontology — that is to say, a non-Cartesian-Kantian form of pluralism (Scott, 
2007a, 2007b).  Arosi, I have argued, experience their socio-cosmic order as formed of 
external relations among a plurality of independently arising and matrilineally reproduced 
autochthonous categories of being.  Now, I realize that — as a revealing intellectual exercise 
— I could re-analyze Arosi cosmology in terms of a nondualist paradigm.  For example: 
taking perspectival animism as a kind of flexible universal constant, I could stretch it to fit 
Arosi variables (compare Holbraad and Willerslev, 2007: 330).  This might involve likening 
the Arosi matrilineal categories to molar bodies that have emerged from the island as from a 
molecular background of virtual multiplicity — a virtual virtual.  This, I might conclude, 
implies that — despite counter-indicative discursive and non-discursive Arosi practices — 
their matrilineages always already contain one another as an intensive insular multiplicity.  
Continuing in this vein, I might work outward from the island, finding ever more extensive 
levels of intensive multiplicity in infinite regress.  I might even posit that the obscure serpent 
deity Agunua, reported by the early twentieth-century missionary ethnographer, Charles E. 
Fox, indexes Arosi speculation about this nondual regress (compare Willerslev, 2011: 517-
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522).  Alternatively, I could irreduce apparent Arosi essentialism to a regime of purifications 
— the poly-ontological constitution — undermined by unacknowledged works of translation.  
I could withdraw my monograph and reissue it as They Have Never Been Poly-ontological.  
But I would hesitate, nonetheless, to call Arosi cosmology nondualist.  To do so, I feel, would 
be to fail to take Arosi essentialism seriously as making a difference in the world.  To adlect 
them to the ranks of indigenous nondualists would be, for me, unfaithful ethnographic 
philosophizing with Arosi. 
But the issue is much bigger than just Arosi.  We might also ask: Have Zoroastrians 
ever been dualists?  Have Vedantists ever been monists?  Was Lucretius ever really a 
pluralist?  Or have all these seeming essentialists always been — in ways betrayed by their 
own surreptitious works of translation — implicitly nondualists?  Or, more likely still, have 
they always been misrepresented by Cartesian-Kantian dualist scholars, deluded by their own 
works of purification into seeing nothing but essentialisms when, in reality, everything has 
always been about fractal relationality?  There are indications that some anthropologists have 
their eyes on Plotinus (Viveiros de Castro, 2007: 164).  This suggests that the ontological 
implications of every neo-Platonism are now up for reconsideration.  Platonism itself may be 
next.  Indeed, the whole world looks set for conversion to nondualism by re-analysis. 
All of this signals a way forward.  When we make magical connections with 
philosophy, we should aim to connect with multivocal debates, not just individual 
philosophers.  In our enthusiasm for philosophers with nondualist leanings, we may be too 
quick to excise their ideas from their original dialogic contexts.  We tend to appropriate a 
preferred reading of their work and leave competing readings aside.  It could easily escape us, 
for example, if reading anthropology alone, that a major question in philosophy is whether 
Deleuzian ontology should be understood as nondualist or monistic (e.g. Bryant, 2011: 59-
72)?  If Deleuze cannot be definitively pinned down on this issue, what are the consequences 
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for our invocations of his concepts to translate indigenous cosmologies as nondualist?  
Consider also the reality that ancient literatures are filled with detailed and prolonged 
controversies over the metaphysical import of myths and other traditions.  It stands to reason, 
then, that the discursive and non-discursive practices of the people we meet in the field are 
equally multi-vocal and amenable to diverse interpretations.  Are Rangi and Papa, the Sky 
Father and Earth Mother of Maori cosmogonic myths, one or two (Schrempp, 1992)?  Does 
sharing a name with a deceased ancestor reveal a relationship of unity or nonduality 
(Willerslev, 2007: 50-72)?  What is the nature of the relationship between an island and the 
beings said to be autochthonous to it (Scott, 2007a: 261-300)? 
In effect, we need to be even more nondual in our magical thinking.  First, we need to 
be less quasi-monistic, remembering to compare rather than conflate when we creatively 
make connections between philosophical and indigenous ontologies.  Second, we need to be 
less quasi-pluralistic, remembering that the philosophers we take up are relations.  They are 
intensive dialogues and extensive debates.  And it is those debates that are most likely to 
resonate with the full range of purifications and translations in which our ethnographic 
partners themselves creatively engage.  True, this implies a methodological nondualism, but 
one that seeks, not to impose itself globally, but to grant actual nondualisms and essentialisms 
equal possibility — one that seeks to elicit difference and multiplicity from others. 
 
[After presentations by others and the ensuing debate, I made the following closing remarks:] 
 
My case for the motion goes like this: When you inadvertently conflate continental 
philosophies with indigenous ontologies, ethnography becomes strangely gnostic — every 
prophet sent from the virtual has the same message.  They say, ‘relations thou art, and unto 
relations shalt thou return!’  Our analyses of indigenous ontologies tend towards de-
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actualisation, restoring every form to the pleroma.  Suddenly all the diversity we said we 
were interested in has turned into an immanent-transcendent blur in which history, processes 
of change, and the profusion of competing ‘purifications’ look increasingly irrelevant.  But 
this need not be so. 
Without losing the creativity to be gained through dialogue with philosophy, we can 
elicit difference and keep history alive.  To that end, I offer a few brief recommendations: 
- Philosophise ethnographically. 
- Make magical connections. 
- Compare but don’t conflate. 
- Let essentialisms be – and even become. 
- Take works of ‘purification’ seriously. 
- Remember that philosophers are relations; so, attend to the debates. 
- Shape-shift between essentialism and nonduality as on a Möbius strip. 
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